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In this article, we discuss the potential of blockchain technology in addressing the
documentation of users’ land rights in the informal land rental market. Blockchain
technology is a peer-to-peer protocol that can be leveraged to keep track of transactions
over the internet. Publicized for its use in the bitcoin revolution, the technology provides
transparency and traceability that can be used in the management of land rights.
When it comes to the formalization of land rights, blockchain technology promises to
authenticate owners and other users of land, and provides a fixed ledger of land use rights
transactions. At present, blockchain technology is being explored as a proof of concept
in several countries to track land titles (state to individual). We extend the idea to capture
the granting of land use rights (individual to individual) making use of the decentralization,
peer-to-peer nature of blockchain technology. While the technology is not a panacea
to all land administration challenges, it can offer an effective means to manage land
transactions, provide digital documentation to actors in the informal land rental market
and reduce inefficiency in land systems. However, the uptake of the technology in land
administration is limited by human related factors. These limitations include, but are not
limited to, the accuracy of data being entered into the system, the ability of the system
to facilitate data preservation, pre-existing institutional and legal pillars, and the digital
divide across communities. Part of overcoming these barriers requires the political will
of governments to invest in digital technologies and develop institutional capacities to
overcome current limitations to bring land management into the industry 4.0 era.
Keywords: blockchain, informal land market, land tenure, agriculture, vernacular land market
1. INTRODUCTION
In this article, we explore the feasibility of blockchain technology in the documentation of land
tenure to enable the empowerment of agricultural land users who participate in vernacular
(informal) land markets. Currently, the idea of blockchain technology for land administration is
being actualized within land registry projects globally to further the efficiency of land registries.
Blockchain is a data structure that rests on distributed ledger technology, which is concerned
with capturing and transferring value (Janowicz et al., 2018). The Distributed Ledger Technology
used in blockchain applications can be described as a “collaboratively managed database of
shared, synchronized, and replicated records that typically does not rely on central governance”
(Janowicz et al., 2018, p. 545).
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The emergence of blockchain as a disruptive technology
has been argued to have potential tremendous impact in land
administration andmanagement (Anand et al., 2016; Reese, 2017;
Shin, 2017; Swan, 2017), which can facilitate the functioning
of land markets in developing countries as well as diminish
the threat of losing land rights for vulnerable communities and
women. Ongoing projects in Ghana, Georgia, and India are
real-time proof that governments have bought into the idea
of blockchain to help in the efficacy of land governance, the
protection of people’s land rights, reduce land conflicts, and
address corruption and land fraud (Reese, 2017; Shin, 2017;
Swan, 2017; Oprunenco and Akmeemana, 2018). Especially
for developing countries, the idea of going from paper to
digital based management is even more important in this
emerging global digital economy, whereby the Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) transformation of
government services (via e-services) is a mechanism for reaching
targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (WBG, 2016).
Whilst blockchain land administration projects focus on the
state to individual relationship to land through the preservation
of titles, there is little discussion or evidence of the application
of blockchain in addressing individual to individual relationships
to land (transferring of rights). The question arises as to
how this nascent technology can be applied to the manifold
verbal land agreements/handshake deals to protect livelihoods,
while maintaining transparency, openness, confidentiality, and
protection of both land users and landowners.
While it is understood that plurality and diversity of rights
and tenure systems exist, in this paper we consider the canonical
example of small-scale farmers who gain access to lands through
vernacular land markets. We draw from case studies of small-
scale farmers, in particular the case of Trinidad and Tobago
wherein informal tenure excludes some farmers from accessing
state incentives for their livelihoods and inhibits livelihood
resilience (Daniel et al., 2019). Through these examples, we will
illustrate how the properties of blockchain apply to the vernacular
land market. Moreover, we highlight how the challenges of
informal access and tenure documentation can benefit from
the transparent nature of blockchain while at the same time
protecting people’s land data in an immutable manner, within the
scope of fit for purpose land administration systems. The article
concludes with a look at the current limitations in the application
of the technology.
2. VERNACULAR LAND MARKETS CREATE
INFORMAL ACCESS
Vernacular Land Markets (VLM) are informal markets through
which land is allocated outside of statutory regulations, rendering
their access informal (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006;
McCarthy et al., 2012). Access to land, which falls outside
of Western land administration conventions, are deemed as
informal regardless of the resilient communal land systems
that uphold cultural identities of communities over generations.
There are many communal tenure regimes in effect throughout
the world under various names such as family land in the
Caribbean, customary tenure in Africa and indigenous lands in
Latin America and Asia. In sub-Saharan Africa, approximately
90% of lands are held under customary tenure (Deininger, 2003).
Studies on the vernacular markets and informal access
highlight the diversity, complexity, and social embeddedness
of land rights negotiations within communal systems (Delville,
2002; Mathieu et al., 2002; Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006;
Choplin and Dessie, 2017; Chimhowu, 2019). However, when
it comes to livelihoods, studies predominantly focused on
ascertaining whether there are direct relationships between
formalization of land rights (titling), livelihood investments and
wellbeing (Bromley, 2008). Although these studies provide mixed
evidence, they mostly focus on traditional communal situations
or squatters, where people occupy the land and legitimately
derive ownership from their socio-cultural ties to the land and
long-term land improvements (Chimhowu and Woodhouse,
2006; Chimhowu, 2019). Other studies on land rental markets
center on the role of tenure security to a functioning rental
market, with emphasis on the leasor’s participation in rental
markets, tenure security and productivity (e.g., Holden et al.,
2009, 2011; Deininger et al., 2011; Lowery et al., 2018) and not
necessarily shedding light on the demand side of the market and
its effect on the leasee’s livelihood.
The VLM is nuanced and there is increasing evidence
of its monetization across the global south, wherein money
is exchanged for use through verbal permissions either on
communal lands (Delville, 2002; Mathieu et al., 2002; Chimhowu
and Woodhouse, 2006), private lands (Stanfield and Singer,
1993), or state lands (Stanfield and Singer, 1993; Choplin
and Dessie, 2017; Daniel et al., 2019), moving away from
traditional reciprocal land relationships. Transactions usually
occur without formal documentation of use rights. Land scarcity
and competition drive demand for land through informal
markets and are mediated through the social-ecological contexts
of societies (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006).
As VLMs continue to evolve to meet the needs of the land
poor, informal access will continue to shape how livelihoods and
social powers unfold over the land. Yet, forging legitimate and
secure rights to land through the VLM is a persistent demand-
side challenge especially in cases where money is transacted for
sale or rental. In relation to VLMs in rural West Africa, Delville
(2002, p. 92) stated that “insecurity in relation to farmland hinges
to a significant degree on the issue of transactions.” The issue of
land transactions brings into focus the contested nature of access
and legitimation.
When it comes to land, legitimate access determines who
has the rightful power to benefit and make exclusive claims to
the land (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). For example, in agricultural
livelihoods in Trinidad and Tobago, Daniel et al. (2019) showed
how the relationship between legitimation and access can
mediate livelihood resilience. The ability of a farmer to access
state entitlements hinges on the type of farmers identification
card in their possession, which is based on tenure documentation.
The type of card determines what farmers can legitimately claim
from the state in terms of livelihood support. Only farmers
with the relevant cards can access state incentives (e.g., for
land preparation, irrigation, chemicals etc.) as well as lines of
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credit from the agricultural bank. These entitlements strengthen
farmers’ overall buffer capacity1 and positively shape their
livelihood resilience. Exclusion from incentives, remove state
buffers for livelihoods, which can then lower farmers’ buffer
capacity. Farmers in the study area who are renting through
the VLM generally tend to feel less secure in their livelihoods
compared to farmers who access a friend or family member’s land
through the VLM (Daniel et al., 2019).
Other studies illustrate the similar interplay of legitimation
and access and the ways people try to establish legitimation
and tenure security through the VLM. For example, Delville
(2002) highlighted that in francophoneWest Africa, farmers used
various forms of documentation such as “little papers” that record
rent payments, written contracts with or without customary
approval, and certificates from extension officers. Mathieu et al.
(2002) also described such a practice in Burkina Faso identifying
five forms of land transaction validations through inscription.
These entail: (i) visible customary acts of gratitude e.g., gift
exchanges; (ii) the presence of a witness during the transaction;
(iii) little papers; (iv) a grant certificate—a semi-formal document
that contains the land agreement and the verified signatures
of both buyer and seller; and (v) a record of palaver—a legal
document about the terms of the land transaction, which bears
the signatures of the administrative and customary authorities
related to the land transaction (Mathieu et al., 2002). The record
of palaver is lodged at the administrative offices and is the initial
step toward gaining a land title (Mathieu et al., 2002). The various
practices of documenting aspects of land transactions were used
as a basis to draw a sense of legitimization and tenure security
through transactions (Delville, 2002; Mathieu et al., 2002).
Choplin and Dessie (2017) described that in Mauritania,
access to state lands through the informal channels called tieb
tieb is usually authorized in front of a Muslim judge. Given the
strength of tieb tieb practices, people who gained land access
in this way generally have a stronger sense of tenure security
compared to access through formal state means since the latter
is lengthy and acquiring titles are expensive (Choplin and Dessie,
2017). These examples of recordation or witnessing are what
Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006) described as a “recourse to
documentation” and a familiar trait of VLMs. Looking at such
actors in the VLM, shifts the focus from the “owners” to the
land users and the inherent need for legitimizing their access
to land through the informal market. In this regard, how can
blockchain assist in the documentation and legitimization of land
users’ rights for their livelihood security and resilience?
3. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND HOW
IT WORKS IN THE LAND ADMINISTRATION
CONTEXT
Blockchain technology is a peer-to-peer protocol that can be
leveraged to keep track of transactions over the internet (Swan,
1Buffer capacity refers to “the capacity to cushion change, and possibly to use the
emerging opportunities to achieve better livelihood outcomes” (Ifejika Speranza,
2013, p. 523).
2017). Publicized for its application in the cryptocurrency
revolution, the technology provides transparency, traceability,
and built-in trust that can be used in the management of land
rights. The purpose of the system is to disintermediate resource
transactions over the internet (Andoni et al., 2019). Built on the
distributed ledger technology, the key tenets of this system are
(Anand et al., 2016; Swan, 2017; Vos et al., 2017; Nasarre-Aznar,
2018):
1. The decentralized peer to peer nature of the database: This
means that there is no central storage of data as each node
that forms part of the distributed system keeps a copy of the
data. In land registry projects, the peer to peer database can
involve several computers within the national land registry
office or across land agencies at the national and municipal
levels, thereby enforcing a type of private blockchain. Nodes
across the system perform various functions such as wallet
services, mining, routing, and storing (Reyna et al., 2018).
In a land registry blockchain system, wallet services by
nodes store public and private keys (Anand et al., 2016).
These keys are needed to create a unique signature or multiple
signatures to initiate a transaction in the system, which are
part of the cryptographic technology of the system (Anand
et al., 2016). Depending on the type of in-built consensus
mechanism [rules for validating transactions (requests) into
the system], all or some nodes (proof of work vs. proof of
stake consensus) can be network validators that verify each
transaction (e.g., to change the landowner’s name for plot A)
before they become part of the ledger (Vos et al., 2017; Reyna
et al., 2018). Nodes also act as routers sending information of
transactions to other nodes in the system (Reyna et al., 2018).
2. The removal of a third-party verification entity in
validating transactions into the ledger (e.g., conveyancer):
Disintermediation is one of the key purposes of blockchain
applications (Ryan, 2017). In a land registry application,
this would mean that there is a reduced need for officers in
land agencies to do title or deed searches or land registrars
or conveyancers to verify document contents and update
a registry.
3. Cryptographic and chronological linkages of transactions:
Embedded in this distributed system are cryptographic
protocols that secure the network and transactions to ensure
data privacy. Transactions containing data are linked in
sequence into a block. A history of all transactions in a
block is stored across all nodes. Once a transaction is added
to the ledger no one can alter it. Additionally, any data
stored in that chain cannot be modified or removed. The
decentralized network, embedded consensus mechanisms and
cryptographic encryptions allow for a tamper-proof database.
Transactions executed in the system are done via smart
contracts. Smart contracts are “programmable applications
that manage exchanges conducted online” (Ryan, 2017). They
can be used to encode legal contracts, terms of conditions
or the steps of a financial transaction, which can run
automatically within a blockchain (Walport, 2016; Ryan,
2017). In so doing, transferring an easement right to another
party can be automatically executed via a smart contract
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FIGURE 1 | A simple schematization of a blockchain application for the exchange of land use rights within a land rental market.
without the need for someone to physically verify, approve
and record the right in the registry (Nasarre-Aznar, 2018).
Smart contracts promote the disintermediation of resource
exchange, with the added benefit of reducing costs associated
with third party actors (Ryan, 2017).
4. DISCUSSION: MATCHING THE
DIMENSIONS OF THE VERBAL LAND
MARKET WITH THE CAPABILITIES OF THE
BLOCKCHAIN
Part of development agencies’ pro-poor agendas underscore
the importance of formalization of land rights as a vehicle
toward economic empowerment for the poor and marginalized.
As such, organizations like the World Bank and the United
Nations’ International Fund for Agriculture and Development
(IFAD) invest in programmes to help vulnerable, indigenous
and marginalized communities to provide formal or quasi
documentation to land rights. For example, the IFAD alone
has invested approximately US$177 million on tenure security
related projects between 2012 and 2016 in 56 developing
countries (IFAD, 2018).
In the individual to individual relationship to land, land
administration systems should assist in the protection of farmers’
use rights through the VLM, the legitimization of farmers,
and foster trust in the rental system by protecting both
landowners and land-users in an incorruptible manner. While
technology has bridged the gaps in capturing different types
of informal tenure, in this new digitalization era two core
concerns remain: data protection and the timely verification
of documented rights obtained through grassroots programmes
(Lengoiboni et al., 2019).
Blockchain technology can work alongside low-cost digital
approaches such as the UN-Habitat Social Tenure Domain
Model (STDM) Tool and the FAO’s2 OpenTenure software for
capturing land rights information on the ground. Once, the
use rights of the parties involved in the rental market are
collected, this information can be piped along a blockchain
driven land administration system for timely, secure, and cost-
effective verification and recordation.
The peer-to-peer value exchanges within the VLM make
blockchain apt for tracking these transactions. Access rights
can be tokenized in the system and the rights transferred from
one party to another through smart contracts, with the digital
footprint of this transaction transparent in the system, but
secured across all nodes (Anand et al., 2016; Nasarre-Aznar,
2018). The updating of the rights exchange over a plot of land
can be validated through smart contracts, which can ensure that
the authorization comes from the owner of the plot and that the
transaction meets the standard criteria (Anand et al., 2016).
Taking the case study of small-scale farmers in Trinidad and
Tobago into consideration (Daniel et al., 2019), farmers in the
VLM can draw on the digital documentation of their use right
(e.g., via an app) for legitimacy as a farmer and land user,
and use this record to request farmers identification cards and
state incentives. Figure 1 demonstrates how such an application
can work. What is envisioned is a private land administration
blockchain with nodes held at the regional County Agricultural
Offices, the Ministry of Agriculture as well as the Agricultural
Development Bank.
The landowner interacts with the blockchain system through
a land rights interface such as the STDM tool on their mobile
2FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
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devices or computers at home or at the County Offices to
record when a new use right is granted to a farmer and the
rental conditions of their agreement (name of tenant, name of
landowner, rental cost, duration, title/lease registration number,
size of plot to be rented etc.). An identification check is performed
via the blockchain system to ascertain whether the landowner
is indeed the owner of the plot that is to be rented. Once the
ownership is established by the system, the farmer receives a
notification via text messaging and/or email to log into the
system to provide consent to the rental contract. Changes in
ownership and rental agreements (e.g., as instructed by legal
rulings) are not specific to the blockchain and take place outside
of the technology. Authorized land administrators can enter the
changes as new data into the system.
The rental transaction is then completed via a series of smart
contracts, which validates the terms of the rental contract, creates,
and records an access right for the land user as well as a farmer
identification credential for the land user. Upon completion, the
farmer will be notified (via text messaging or app) to login to
the system and view the recorded contract. He or she can then
download a certificate of the contract and farmers ID. If the
farmer wants to get a loan from the Agricultural Development
Bank to start land preparation, this request can be facilitated
through the blockchain since the bank is a nodal point of the land
administration system. Each step of the loan process from the
initial request by the farmer, to documentation checks, approval,
consent, and payment can be automated across the distributed
system through a series of smart contracts. As a node, the bank
can easily verify a farmer’s tenure. Once the loan transaction
is validated, it can be appended to the farmer’s tenure data on
the chain and monies directly paid to his/her account. Such an
approach to regulating the verbal market is a mechanism for
securing people on the property ladder but also for transforming
agriculture and placing and securing agricultural stakeholders on
the digital agriculture ladder.
Blockchain technology has the potential to digitally transform
legacy systems in land and agricultural administration in
developing countries. At its core, blockchain reflects the theory of
documentality in which social objects (agreements, permissions,
rights, payments, registration of marriage etc.) of the world are
recorded and these records create new kinds of social relations
and powers (Ferraris, 2012; Smith, 2012, 2014; Ferraris and
Torrengo, 2014). In this regard, the verbal rental agreement and
permission of use rights are given a materiality as artifacts in
the distributed system that endure through time. These digital
artifacts are the “content produced in the social act [rental
agreement] and then recorded somewhere that establishes the
nature of the actual constraints, and guarantees the endurance of
the social object [use right]” (Ferraris and Torrengo, 2014, p. 16).
They transfer performative action and deontic powers to actors
(e.g., both landowner and farmer) tied to these artifacts (Ferraris,
2012; Smith, 2012), which both actors can use to strategize their
livelihoods. For the VLM, blockchain provides the architecture to
record and track land rights transactions, through which farmers
gain the power to use this record to access other resources (e.g.,
loans, state incentives) for their livelihoods. In so doing, the
technology helps in addressing the documentation issue that
prevents farmers who access land from the VLM from further
developing and securing their livelihood due to a lack of tenure
documents to prove their legitimate use right.
We see at least the following properties of the verbal land
market that correspond to properties of blockchain technology.
An explanation is provided below on how these properties of the
VLM and blockchain are related and can be generally leveraged
for the documentation of use rights for farmers in the vernacular
land market.
1. Peer-to-Peer Relationships: The VLMs are characterized by
handshake deals and oral agreements. The very nature of
the vernacular land market is to offer access to lands (albeit
informal) so that actors (both owners and users) can derive
mutual benefit. These transactions in the market between
farmer and landowner are in nature peer to peer, similar to
transactions within a blockchain database. However, in the
VLM, the transaction is inscribed in the memories of the
parties involved, witnesses, and through payment receipts
for the land on which people draw legitimization in their
transaction (Delville, 2002; Mathieu et al., 2002; Chimhowu
and Woodhouse, 2006; Choplin and Dessie, 2017). Yet,
payment receipts are not a placeholder for tenure documents
and tenure security cannot be pegged on such receipts.
In a blockchain, the transcription of the transaction is
durable, which can be verified at any time and used in other
digital transactions for a farmer’s livelihood that require a
documented proof of use right. In so doing, the blockchain
provides a digital footprint of a farmer’s land transaction,
which he/she can use to access other livelihood resources.
2. Legitimization: Vernacular land markets can either enable
or disable the legitimization of farmers through informal
access to lands. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago,
informal access prevented farmers from legitimizing their
role, which prevented some farmers from accessing state
incentives (Daniel et al., 2019). In other examples, a “recourse
to documentation” is taken by individuals as a means to bring
legitimacy to land transactions and forge a sense of tenure
security (Delville, 2002; Mathieu et al., 2002; Chimhowu and
Woodhouse, 2006). General livelihood resilience is dependent
on documented tenure for access to resources (Daniel et al.,
2019).
However, a consequence of low cost technological means
of capturing rights is the slow pace of verification as “it
is the question of how, when and by whom both the
analog documents as well as the digital data are considered
legitimate and for what purposes they can be legitimately
used” (Lengoiboni et al., 2019, p. 27). A blockchain approach
provides the added value of having to not depend solely on
human intervention for verifying and approving land data
thereby making the process quick and cost-effective. The
digital footprint of the transaction and artifact of land rights
within the land administration system can be used to draw
legitimacy in land usage or ownership by actors. In the case
of the VLM, a series of smart contracts can be executed within
the system, for example, to legally verify the landowner and
his/her capacity to enter into a rental contract, terms of the
rental agreement, leasees consent to the terms that are needed
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to fulfill the contractual engagement and confer the use right
to the farmer.
3. Confidentiality and Trust: Vernacular land markets are
characterized by confidentiality and trust. In some cases,
it is the fear of losing the land that prevents landowners
from documenting rental agreements with farmers or even
entering a rental agreement in the first place. For example,
in Brazil, small-scale farmers who are landowners shy away
from renting lands to large-scale farmers and corporations for
fear of being dispossessed in the process (Arsenault, 2016).
Lack of trust and insecurity therefore outweighs potential
economic benefits and contribute to an under-performing
agricultural rental land market (under 4% of lands) in the
country (Arsenault, 2016).
Trust plays a role in whether farmers receive some type
of legal or quasi legal documentation for usage. In a national
land tenure study in Trinidad and Tobago, Lemel (1993)
stated that private landowners in Trinidad and Tobago
largely avoided providing rental contracts or some form of
tenure documentation to agricultural users for fear of adverse
possession by renters (approximately 44% of landowners
did not provide any form of documentation while 10%
provided lease documents). In the present case of the VLM for
agricultural lands in Trinidad and Tobago, the lack of tenure
documentation still exists (Daniel et al., 2019). It can also be
assumed that the lack of tenure documentation to support
agricultural rentals in Trinidad and Tobago is still a cautionary
measure taken by landowners.
Where there is a need to establish trust in transactions, as is
in the case of the VLM for agriculture, blockchain provides
a good opportunity to facilitate rights (value) exchange
between parties in the land market. The very nature of the
blockchain is its built-in trust as the system is based on the
principle of disintermediation of data exchange in a secure
and incorruptible manner (Swan, 2017). The landowner
and farmer do not need to establish trust between each
other to document their transaction. Rather trust transcends
the parties involved and is placed in “the computational
smart network system” of blockchain (Swan, 2017). Through
the system, confidence in land market transactions can be
harnessed knowing that rights exchanges and recordation only
occur when the requests are authenticated and confirmed
based on specified system rules. Data across the system are
timestamped and stored cryptographically thus ensuring that
landowners and land users’ data are confidential, but at the
same time if a landowner and farmer wants to view the
information about their land transaction he/she can access
this securely. Once the transactions are recorded on the
chain, it will make it easier to track land usage and prevent
adverse possession.
5. CONCLUSION
This article put forward arguments for the potential use of
a blockchain application in managing and legitimizing land
transactions through the Vernacular Land Market. Discussion
papers on blockchain for land administration primarily focus on
the state to individual relationship to land i.e., representing and
storing titles through this technology. The objective of this article
was to highlight the strong commonalities between the VLM
and blockchain and how these commonalities can be leveraged
for deriving legitimization for land users such as small-scale
farmers and their livelihoods. As most food production in the
global south occur on informal tenure mediated through the
VLM, the VLM presents a ripe use case for where blockchain
applications targeted for land administration can be most
beneficial. Furthermore, it has the potential to transform legacy
systems used in overall agriculture administration, for example,
to provide digital identification of farmers, subsidy pay-outs in
the form of digital payments to farmers, as well as monitor
agricultural usage and production levels on farms through the
tracking of land rights stored within the system.
In this article, the primary focus was on the application of
blockchain to establish legitimacy in land transactions through
the VLM. Emphasis was placed on the digital documentation of
use rights, which can be called upon by land users to prove their
tenure, establish a sense of security and access other livelihood
resources. In the process, both landowners and land users’ rights
can be verified and protected in land dealings and in so doing
quell fears of land dispossession between entities. With the
distributed ledger technology in place keeping track of land use
rights, land officials can have a better oversight of lands through
rental markets, their land management and can use the records
to monitor and sanction unsustainable use.
While the potential for blockchain in this special case
is evident, we also need to be realistic and critical about
the limitations of blockchain for land administration. Firstly,
blockchain cannot magically fix pre-existing contestations over
lands and the bringing of communal tenure under statutory
regulations (Anand et al., 2016; Vos et al., 2017). Such issues are
related to the institutional and legal pillars of land administration,
which have to determine how best to bring diverse tenure regimes
under statutory oversight (Lengoiboni et al., 2019). Thus, a
blockchain application to land administration will likely work
best in cases where there are no land ownership issues to facilitate
land transactions (rental or sale) involving titled or state leased
lands (Vos et al., 2017). However, blockchain technology can
be used to prevent titled lands in communities transitioning to
informal tenure due to changes in ownership that have not been
updated in land registries.
Secondly, although blockchains are stated to be immutable,
the system is not entirely immune to vulnerabilities. Nodes can
be compromised through the hacking of cryptographic keys,
which can allow an intruder control of the system to manipulate
transactions (Saad et al., 2019) such as invalidating a rental
agreement transaction. The manipulation of land transactions
can also occur through the exploitation of possible loopholes
in smart contract algorithms by savvy hackers (Lemieux, 2017).
Furthermore, precautions must be taken to ensure that data
entered into the system by human actors are correct as fake
data will lead to the propagation of erroneous data across the
system. Since “there is nothing inherent in the blockchain that
fundamentally alters the accuracy of recording” the accuracy of
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the data within the system is dependent on data entry practices
of human actors outside of the system (Lemieux, 2017, p. 416).
Thirdly, questions arise regarding the ability of blockchain
systems to facilitate the archival function of data preservation
over time (Lemieux, 2017, 2019). For example, in blockchain
land administration projects, original records are not stored on
the system but hashes of the data (Lemieux, 2017). Any changes
or loss in the original data and disruption to database servers
undermine the veracity of the data stored in blockchain systems.
Therefore, facilitating land transactions and data authentication
for present and future needs are dependent on the integrity of the
original data stored in central land databases so that hashes to the
original and stored data in the blockchain always sync (Lemieux,
2017). Maintaining the original land data integrity over time is
dependent on human, institutional, and technological capacities
in overall data management (Lemieux, 2017).
Fourthly, there is a risk of excluding parties that are not
digitally literate. What happens when a party is not computer-
literate enough to initiate the transactions itself and needs an
intermediary as is the case with many smallholder farmers?
Considering that many farmers in rural areas of developing
countries have low digital literacy (Trendov et al., 2019), the
effectiveness of blockchain technology hinges on the integrity of
the persons or organizations managing it by mediating between
the blockchain and the farmer, as it will likely take some years
for most of such farmers to engage directly with blockchain
based land tenure verification. Yet the fast adoption of mobile
phones in developing countries shows there is potential in
exploring blockchain for improving land tenure and bridging the
digital divide in agriculture. For example, evidence from mobile
payments services show that Sub-Saharan Africa is the global
frontrunner in the use of mobile money with one in 10 African
adults using these services (Chironga et al., 2017).
The emergence of blockchain technology and the hype
to utilize it for sustainable development can be used as an
opportunity to springboard the digital economy in developing
countries and attend to first mile issues (GEF, 2019). Addressing
these first mile issues require investments by the public
and private sectors into internet connectivity and access to
internet and mobile phones especially in rural areas (WBG,
2016; UNCTAD, 2019). Despite mobile service uptake, Africa
commands only 4% of internet access globally (Lavery et al.,
2018). Additionally, improving digital literacy is essential so that
people, especially women and the poor, can benefit from the
digital economy and reduce the inequality gap within the digital
divide (Townsend et al., 2019; UNCTAD, 2019). Therefore, for
blockchain based land tenure verification to be effective, farmers
will require access to: (i) internet networks and internet enabled
devices, (ii) education on digital services within agriculture
and how to use them to secure land access, and (iii) technical
officers who can facilitate farmers in carrying out mobile land
transactions. Putting these building blocks in place will help
to close the digital divide and facilitate livelihood security
via blockchain.
Lastly, the adoption of blockchain technology in property
related matters require that certain institutional and legal
arrangements for digitalization are in place, especially in
developing countries. These include but are not limited
to: the presence of digital infrastructure such as internet
connectivity, digitized land information, data protection
frameworks, the establishment of standards and legal conditions
for smart contracts. Like any new technology, the uptake
of blockchain to address informal land markets and overall
land administration first require political will and buy
in from state officials and key actors. Nevertheless, as the
technology matures and institutions catch up to the new digital
reality, the untapped potential of blockchain could eventually
be realized.
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